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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Wigmore calls this type of argument "a rusty weapon" because it could
be used against admitting any witness.1 4
The first well-known judicial challenge to the rule was made by
Mr. Justice Holmes in the dissent in Donnelly v. United States.Y5 In
that case, at issue was the admissibility of testimony concerning a con-
fession, made by the declarant before he died, that he had committed
the murder for which the defendant was being tried. The majority of
the Court disallowed the testimony because it was not a declaration
against the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interests. Holmes re-
torted, "[N]o other statement is so much against [the declarant's] inter-
est as a confession of murder. ... "16
Because of the inconsistencies in reasoning, the majority rule as
applied does not withstand a close examination. Therefore, it is being
eliminated by some courts, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court with this
recent decision takes its place with the leaders in recognizing a need
for the change. As Professor Wigmore said, it cannot be accepted as
a settled and universal rule. It requires the rejection of a confession
in a criminal trial, no matter how well authenticated, of a deceased,
insane or otherwise unavailable witness who has avowed himself to be
the true culprit. Yet, "[any rule which hampers an honest man in
exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in
falsely passing for an innocent.' 71
Katherine Lawin
JUVENILE LAW-ADMISSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF
CONFESSIONS MADE PRIOR TO JUVENILE CoU.RT'S WAIVER OF ITS
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. State v. Loyd, - Minn. -, 212 N.W.
2d 671 (1973).
In the recent case of State v. Loyd' the Minnesota Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that an extrajudicial confession given by a juvenile,
14. 5 WIGMoRE, supra note 7, § 1477, at 288.
15. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
-16. Id. at 278.
17. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1477, at 289.
1. State v, Loyd, - Minn, -, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973).
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before a juvenile court has waived its exclusive jurisdiction and referred
him to be prosecuted as an adult, is admissible in a criminal prosecu-
tion. Of course, the juvenile must have been apprised of -his constitu-
tional rights and voluntarily and intelligently waived such rights in mak-
ing the confession.2
Juvenile courts adopt a parens patriae relationship with the chil-
dren before them. The juvenile court systems are aimed at rehabilita-
tion, not punishment. Since the purpose of the proceeding is to en-
courage the development of an open and confidential relationship be-
tween -the juvenile and the court, the process is informal, not -adver-
sarial. As a consequence of the court's inducing this atmosphere, the
courts commonly exclude statements gathered in the juvenile proceed-
ing from being used against -the child. A question arises, however,
about confessions made -by juveniles who are later certified as adults.
This problem of the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession made
prior to the child's certification as an adult has been faced by several
jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have ruled on the admissibility in
three separate ways:
(1) PER SE EXCLUSION-The District of Columbia' has ex-
cluded from use in adult prosecutions all confessions of ju-
veniles if the confession was made while the juvenile was in
the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(2) EXPRESS WARNING REQUIRED-The above per se ex-
clusionary rule was modified in Arizona4 to allow such juve-
nile confessions, made while the child was still under the ju-
risdiction of the juvenile court, only if the child and his
parents were expressly warned that criminal prosecution
might result.
(3) IMPLIED WARNING REQUIRED-Other states have re-
jected the strict exclusionary rule without requiring an ex-
press warning that adult prosecution may result.5  These
states rely upon the adversary nature of the out-of-court po-
lice interrogation as being sufficient warning to the child.
2. Juveniles as well as adults are entitled to be apprised of their constitutional
rights according to the dictates of Miranda. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Harling v. United
States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
4. State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967).
5. People v. Hester, 39 IMI. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968); State v. Gullings, 244
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These jurisdictions hold that the prohibition against evidence
given in juvenile court cases does not extend to police inves-
tigations unless the child legitimately believed that a protec-
tive non-adversarial relationship existed at the police ques-
tioning.
The Loyd case involved the interpretation of a Minnesota state
statute6 which reads in part, "The disposition of the child or any evi-
dence given by the child in the juvenile court shall not be admissible
as evidence against him in any case or proceeding in any other court
In the Loyd case, the appellant was a 16-year-old who had been
tried as an adult and found guilty of aggravated robbery. The youth
previously had been in trouble with the police, was on juvenile parole,
and was acquainted with the arresting officer.
The officer gave Loyd a standard Miranda7 warning, but did not
expressly inform him of the possibility that he might be prosecuted as
an adult. In the presence of his parents" the defendant waived his
rights and confessed the 'robbery. He subsequently signed a confes-
sion.
At trial, a conflict arose as to the time of a conversation between
Loyd and the arresting officer concerning Loyd's possible punishment.
Defendant alleged that ,the officer told him, before the confession, that
he would only be sent back to 'a state (juvenile) training center. The
officer maintained that such a discussion did not occur until after the
confession. On this important issue relating to inducement of the con-
fession the trial court accepted the officer's version of the incident.
Nearly two months after the arrest and confession, the juvenile
court waived its exclusive jurisdiction over Loyd and referred him for
prosecution as an -adult.' Defendant attempted to suppress the confes-
sion. The motion failed, and its denial was the main basis of the ap-
peal.
The decision of the state supreme court to allow the confession
in the -adult proceeding is important for the distinction it made between
the treatment of a juvenile by a juvenile court and by the police. The
court -asserted the general rule that between a juvenile and the juvenile
6. MnqN. STAT. Ar. § 260.211, subdiv. 1 (1971).
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Parental or attorney presence is required by statute in Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 10, § 1109(a) (1973).
9. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (1971).
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court a parens patriae relationship exists. The court said, however,
there is no such relationship between the juvenile and the police. A
police interrogation is patently unlike the juvenile court proceeding.
The police interrogation may well be so adversarial as to be understood
as such even by the child. Therefore, statements made during police
interrogations are not protected although the same statements would
be protected if made in a juvenile court. Defendant Loyd's prior fa-
miliarity with police interrogations was accepted as evidence of his
awareness of this adversarial relationship.
Oklahoma has not yet ruled on a factual situation similar to that
in Loyd. Like Minnesota, Oklahoma has a statute that demands exclu-
sion of any evidence given in a juvenile cause. 10 Oklahoma juvenile
courts may also waive their jurisdiction and certify a child for prosecu-
tion as an adult."
There are no reported cases in Oklahoma determining whether
a juvenile's confession made prior to certification is admissible in his
criminal trial.
If the juvenile waives his Miranda rights and confesses to the po-
lice, prior to the juvenile court's waiving of its exclusive jurisdiction,
then Oklahoma will have to decide the scope of exclusion demanded
by its statute.
As with the other jurisdictions, the Oklahoma courts will ,have a
choice of three interpretations of the statute: per se exclusion, requir-
ing an express warning, or requiring an implied warning.
The third alternative was -the one adopted by -the Minnesota court.
It is this writer's opinion that requiring only an implied warning is fair
and is the most practical of the choices. It protects the child from de-
ception without burdening the police with additional technical warning
requirements. Of course, requiring only the implied warning would
more often result in permitting the use of the confessions than would
application of the other tests. This does not seem unfair since juveniles
certified -to be tried as adults in Oklahoma 12 -must exhibit a certain "so-
phistication and maturity,"' 3 know right from wrong, and be account-
able for their actions.' 4
10. OKLA. STAT. fit. 10, § 1127(a) (1973).
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (1973).
12. See generally Clark, Certification of Minors for Criminal Prosecution, 44 OKA.
B. Ass'N J. 1807 (1973).
13. O, .. STAT. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (6) (1973).
14. Freshour v. Turner, 496 P.2d 389 (Okla. Grim. App. 1972).
1974]
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Such a certified juvenile would seem to have sufficient awareness
of potential criminal responsibility to put him on notice that no parens
patriae relationship exists between himself and the interrogating police.
"No 'principles of fundamental fairness' are offended when the infor-
mation is secured in a setting that is so patently adversarial as to be
understood by the child."'15
The Oklahoma statute is unclear as to whether all evidence gath-
ered while the juvenile court has jurisdiction is proscribed from use in
a subsequent criminal trial, or if only that evidence brought to light in
the juvenile court itself should be so disallowed. The former interpre-
lation would mandate the per se exclusionary rule discussed above.
Such a burdensome rule would allow confessed criminals to suppress
their confessions which were intelligently made to police. Oklahoma
would do well to follow the Minnesota Supreme Court and allow the
use in criminal prosecutions of confessions made by juveniles to police
prior to the juvenile court's waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction, at least
when the juvenile is impliedly warned about the adversary nature of
the proceeding.
Robert D. Frank
15. State v. Gullings, 244 Ore. 173, 178, 416 P.2d 311, 313 (1966).
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